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Abstract. With a market capitalisation of over USD 205 billion in just under
ten years, public distributed ledgers have experienced significant adoption. Apart
from novel consensus mechanisms, their success is also accountable to smart con-
tracts. These programs allow distrusting parties to enter agreements that are ex-
ecuted autonomously. However, implementation issues in smart contracts caused
severe losses to the users of such contracts. Significant efforts are taken to im-
prove their security by introducing new programming languages and advance
verification methods. We provide a survey of those efforts in two parts. First,
we introduce several smart contract languages focussing on security features. To
that end, we present an overview concerning paradigm, type, instruction set, se-
mantics, and metering. Second, we examine verification tools and methods for
smart contract and distributed ledgers. Accordingly, we introduce their verifica-
tion approach, level of automation, coverage, and supported languages. Last, we
present future research directions including formal semantics, verified compilers,
and automated verification.
1 Introduction
The idea of contracts between independent parties goes back to autonomous agents
using a network of agents to solve tasks distributed and based on individual contracts
as presented in the contract net protocol [1]. The idea was further elaborated by Szabo
using the term “smart contract”, concentrating on minimising and ideally excluding the
need for trust in either party, [2]. Significant work focussed on creating languages and
frameworks for electronic contracts even before the inception of distributed ledgers, for
example, [3]–[5].
Smart contracts based on distributed ledgers combine two unique properties: anyone
can create such contracts for the whole world to interact with, while each line of code
(LoC) might affect a significant amount of currency. These contracts allow economic
interactions between different parties without the need to trust one another. Contracts
are concerned with a range of use cases, includig financial services, notaries, games,
wallets, or libraries [6]. Further, smart contracts are the enabler of protocols build on top
of distribued legers, for example, Lightning [7], Plasma [8], Polkadot [9], and TrueBit
[10]. However, security incidents caused by software bugs have lead to severe losses as
in the infamous The DAO incident [11], and Parity multi-sig vulnerabilities [12], [13].
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Substantial efforts are taken to prevent future incidents. High-level programming
languages are introduced to encourage safe programming practices, for example [14]–
[16]. Languages for distributed virtual machines that allow for easy verification are
realised, for example [17]–[20]. Tools for analysing source code by symbolic modelling
and execution, for example [21]–[24] as well as formal semantics and verification, for
example [25]–[27], are developed.
Contribution The number of new languages, approaches for verification, and applica-
bility of verification methods becomes quickly opaque. Due to the practical impact of
these approaches to real-world smart contracts, we present a literature survey on current
languages and verification efforts. We contribute an overview of contract language se-
curity features including paradigm, instruction set, semantic, and metering. Further, we
describe different efforts to verify software including model- and proof-based methods.
Our overview includes an analysis of the level of automation, coverage, and supported
languages.
Structure The remainder of our article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the background of contracts and languages to express them. We present an overview
and a classification of languages in section 3. Similarly, verification approaches are
examined in section 4. Results and future work is discussed in section 5. We conclude
in section 6.
2 Safer smart contracts
Contracts are a requirement resulting from an inherent lack of trust between parties.
Smart contracts execute agreements on a distributed ledger like Bitcoin or Ethereum
[28], [29]. The ledger’s consensus protocol ensures correct execution of the smart con-
tract, whereby a majority agrees on the accepted result. Consensus protocols enable
mutually distrusting parties to create contracts and interact. However, no single defi-
nition of a smart contract exists. Information and definitions are scattered in academia
and various communities (e.g. Bitcoin and Ethereum Improvement Proposals). The ca-
pabilities of smart contracts range from restrictive (i.e. Bitcoin) to Turing-complete
instruction sets (i.e. Ethereum). Whether or not smart contracts have legal implications
or not is also widely discussed. Moreover, there is a caveat with distributed ledgers and
consensus protocols. Results of contracts need to be fully deterministic so that each
(honest) actor in the consensus protocol reaches a single common output with the same
set of inputs.
2.1 Technical overview
Smart contracts need a low-level language that allows deterministic execution. A high-
level language can make it easier for developers to create new contracts and reason
about existing contracts. In software development, having different sets of languages is
a conventional process. Similarly, we can distinguish three different levels of languages
for smart contracts.
High-level languages They should provide a way to express the desired contracts.
Multiple high-level languages can exist in parallel to be executed on the same ledger.
Examples for high-level languages are Solidity [30] and Liquidity [31].
Intermediary representations IRs are between low-level and high-level languages.
IRs can be used to write programs to reason about properties (like safety or liveness) or
optimising code. Examples include Simplicity [32] and Scilla [17].
Low-level languages These need to implement the contract in a deterministic way to
be executed on a distributed virtual machine (VM). Examples include Bitcoin Script
[33] and EVM bytecode [34].
Distributed ledger The ledger, implemented, e.g. as a blockchain or DAG, plays a
vital role in the design of the language. The distributed ledger can be separated in trans-
action and scripts, consensus protocol, and network protocol. A more in-depth review
is available from [35]. Bitcoin implements a UTXO model [28], [36], where contracts
are stored in the scriptSig and scriptPubKey of a transaction. Hence, contracts
only cover a single transaction or need to be “chained” over multiple ones. Account-
based ledgers store contracts at a specific address. Contracts have a local state, and their
functions can be called multiple times. State-changing functions are invoked by sending
a transaction to a contract function exposed via its Application Binary Interface (ABI).
Contracts can typically access a global state to receive information stored in the ledger
as block timestamps, block hashes, or transaction data.
2.2 Security properties
Desired properties of smart contracts include safety and liveness [17]. Safety refers
to satisfying specific correctness properties during any state on a contract. Liveness
describes that certain events may eventually occur. Analysis of vulnerabilities violating
security properties with a focus on the EVM is presented in [21] and [37]. Grishchenko,
Maffei, and Schneidewind extend this work by introducing a formal definition of gen-
eral security properties for smart contracts [38]:
Call integrity A contracts state may depend on an external call. Specifically, a contract
can execute code of an external contract within its functions, call another contract’s
function and wait for its returned value, or call another contract that changes the global
state or re-enters the calling contract. In these cases, the contract’s control flow should
not be influenced by an adversary contract.
Atomicity Functions should be executed entirely, or the state should be reverted, ex-
cept when specifically allowed during exception handling. If a contract function has,
for example, a call instruction not at the end of the function, the call might execute
successfully, but the remainder of the function might terminate due to, e.g. out-of-gas
error or a stack limit. Smart contracts are drained when a function sends currency and
updates the balance after the send (which would not happen in case of an exception).
Independence Transactions change the state of a contract. Miners and other parties
can control or influence parameters in contracts or transactions. For example, a contract
might use a timestamp-dependent function, which can in certain ranges be influenced
by miners. Also, the ordering of transactions can be influenced by miners or others
paying higher fees. Hence, contracts should ideally be independent of the global state
or parameters that can be influenced externally.
Runtime correctness The aforementioned properties apply to general contracts. How-
ever, each contract serves a distinct purpose. Properties particular to the expected be-
haviour of a contract need to be defined to ensure the runtime correctness of the contract.
3 Contract languages
Figure 3 gives an overview of smart contract languages. The approach in (A) is often
used to allow program optimisation and verification (e.g. [39]). Among the projects
that follow this approach is Ethereum with Yul [40], and Tezos with Liquidity [31] and
Michelson [18]. Likewise, Scilla is an IR that is targeted by more general languages and
compiles down to be executed on a distributed VM [17].
Smart contracts are a comparably new discipline. Hence, in the early stages, smart
contracts were designed as represented by (B). Bitcoin Script [33] requires program-
mers to write code directly in the low-level stack-based language. Ethereum, on the
other hand, offers multiple high-level languages like Solidity [30] and Vyper [15].
These languages compile directly to EVM bytecode.
cont r act  Token {
  mappi ng( addr ess=>ui nt )  bal ance;
  f un t r ansf er ( t o,  amount ) {
    r equi r e ( bal ance[ msg. sender ]       
      >= amount ) ;
    bal ance[ msg. sender ]  - = amount ;
    bal ance[ t o]  += amount ;
    
    r et ur n t r ue;   
  }
  f un get Bal ance( )  {
    r et ur n bal ance[ msg. sender ] ;
  }
}
High-level contract language
. . .
t r ansi t i on Tr ansf er
  ( sender :  addr ess,
   val ue:  ui nt ,
   r ecei ver :  addr ess)
  i f  bal  >= amount
  t hen send ( <t o - > 
sender ,  amount  - > 0)
. . .
Intermediate representation
. . .
PUSH2 0x10 JUMPI  
PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT 
JUMPDEST POP PUSH1 
0xDF DUP1 PUSH2 0x1F 
PUSH1 0x0 CODECOPY 
PUSH1 0x0 RETURN STOP 
PUSH1 0x80 PUSH1 0x40 
MSTORE PUSH1 0x4 
CALLDATASI ZE LT PUSH1 
0x49 JUMPI  
. . .
Low-level contract language
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Fig. 1. Different levels of smart contract languages with syntax closely resembled to Solidity
(high-level), Scilla (IR), and EVM bytecode (low-evel). (A) represents an optimised version of
compiling high-level languages towards the bytecode that allows for example for verification
of the IR contract and code optimisations, for example envisioned by [17], [31]. (B) represents
the straightforward compilation from high-level language to bytecode representation as currently
employed by Solidity and the EVM [30], [34].
3.1 Overview
The overview we present in table 1 is based on five different criteria as listed below.
The table gives a general overview. We explain the security properties of the languages
within the following subsections.
– Type: We differentiate between high-level, IR, and low-level languages.
– Paradigm: This describes the main paradigm of the language. Note that most lan-
guages support multiple paradigms and this criterion is more of an indication of the
prevalent paradigm.
– Instructions: The possible instruction set that a language supports can be restricted
or Turing-complete.
– Semantics: Languages have a formal or informal semantic. Formal semantics de-
fine the exact behaviour of programs written in that language. Informal semantics
mostly let the compiler define the exact behaviour.
– Metering: Smart contracts executed on a distributed ledger are re-executed by sev-
eral nodes. As these computations are costly, metering is a way to charge and limit
the execution of a program.
3.2 Languages
High-level Solidity is the most widely used smart contract language and created for
Ethereum [30]. Bamboo is designed with formal verification in mind and makes state-
transition explicit [14]. Vyper restricts instructions (e.g. finite loops and no recursive
calls) and prevents other features such as inheritance and overloading [15]. Flint further
introduces the definition of function access (by defining the address of the caller) and
creates an asset type [16]. Pyramid Scheme is functional and imperative promoting
separation of state-changing and static functions [41].
Obsidian models contracts as finite state machines (FSM) with explicit state transi-
tion functions [42]. Rholang focusses on concurrency and message-passing with stati-
cally typed communication channels [43]. Liquidity has a restricted instruction set and
enables formal verification [31]. Rholang and Liquidity are intended for permission-
less distributed ledgers. DAML is functional and developed for financial applications,
primarily on permissioned ledgers [44]–[52]. Similar, Pact is designed for the Kadena
permissioned blockchain [19]. Both have a restricted instruction set and with the inten-
tion to promote formal verification.
Intermediary Simplicity is a pure functional language that places itself as an inter-
mediary representation between a higher level (functional) language and a low-level
VM [32]. Scilla is functional with an automata-based design using explicit state transi-
tion functions and handling for communication patterns [17]. Yul (formerly IULIA and
JULIA) is introduced as part of Solidity and its compiler [40]. EthIR is a decompila-
tion target for EVM bytecode [24]. IELE is derived from its formal semantics and used
as an IR for smart contracts [20]. Scilla, Yul, EthIR, and IELE use an account-based
blockchain model. Simplicity is built with a UTXO model in mind.
Table 1. Overview of high-level languages for smart contracts.
Language Paradigm Instructions Semantics Metering Ref.
Solidity contract-oriented complete informal gas, limit [30]
Vyper procedural restricted informal gas, limit [15]
Bamboo procedural complete semi† gas, limit [14]
Flint procedural complete informal gas, limit [16]
Pyramid Scheme functional complete informal gas, limit [41]
Obsidian object-oriented – informal – [42]
Rholang concurrent complete informal phlogiston [43]
Liquidity functional restricted semi† gas, limit [31]
DAML functional restricted – – [44]–[52]
Pact functional restricted semi† gas, limit [19]
Simplicity pure functional restricted formal – [32]
Scilla functional restricted formal gas, limit [17]
Yul procedural complete informal gas, limit [40]
EthIR procedural complete informal gas, limit [24]
IELE register-based complete formal gas, limit [20]
Bitcoin Script stack-based restricted informal script size [33]
EVM stack-based complete informal‡ gas, limit [34]
eWASM stack-based complete informal gas, limit [53]
Michelson stack-based restricted semi† gas, limit [18]
† These languages are actively developed. There are efforts to define a formal semantics.
‡ The EVM has been informally defined in [34]. Formal semantics have been defined afterwards
by [26], [27].
Low-level Smart contracts are stored on a distributed ledger in the low-level language
to be executed by the distributed VM. Bitcoin scripts are a sequence of op-codes stored
within transactions in the Bitcoin network [33]. The EVM stores programs in the data
field of an address in the Ethereum network [34]. eWASM is a proposed successor of the
EVM based on a deterministic variant of Web Assembly (WASM) [53], [54]. Michelson
is the low-level language of the Tezos blockchain [18]. It uses accounts as well but is
designed to promote formal verification.
General purpose languages Apart from using DSLs for programming smart contracts,
projects like Hyperledger Fabric or Neo use general purpose programming languages.
This can have advantages as those languages are already known to potential developers,
and verification tools might already exist. For example, Hyperledger Fabric uses Docker
containers with smart contracts (so-called “chaincode”) written in Go, Java, or Node.js
[55].
However, as these languages are originally not designed for smart contracts the
global state of the ledger needs to imported through special functions that are typically
not available in these languages. Moreover, these languages often have support for in-
finite loops and recursion which are not desirable. Particular types like assets or units
also need to be defined appropriately.
3.3 Paradigm
Explicit state transitions Languages including Scilla, Rholang, Bamboo, and Obsid-
ian as well as interfaces to Solidity [56] represent contracts as finite state machines
(FSM) or automata. This concept prevents reentrancy and allows to create explicit state
transition function. A transaction that is sent to a contract with the intention to change
the state either is successful or raises an exception. Moreover, this principle should pre-
vent any calls to other contracts within a state transition function. A state might end or
begin with a message (i.e. tail-call), but not have any external calls within the state that
may change it unpredictably.
contract Voting() { ... }
contract VotingClosed() { ... }
contract Result() { ... }
Listing 1.1. A separation of states represented in Bamboo, where each state represents a different
contract at the same address.
Functional programming Pyramid Scheme, Vyper, Simplicity, Scilla, and Bamboo as
well as Pact and DAML for permissioned chains, use functional programming paradigms.
Functions in these languages can be designed to be atomic and execute entirely or re-
vert. Also, pure functions can be used to indicate that the local or global state is not
affected. Functions can call pure functions, but no other state-changing functions.
Logic programming Logic-based languages are interesting as they closely resemble
natural language contracts and have been explored in [57]. Logic languages can be
purposely non-deterministic. However, they transfer the burden of determinism to the
low-level languages and the compiler.
Stack-based All low-level languages are stack-based. Their low-level implementation
makes a manual inspection of contracts cumbersome. Hence, automated tools can help
to support such verification efforts. Moreover, decompilers are used to convert the stack
into a higher level language.
3.4 Instruction set
Restricted instructions Vyper, Liquidity, DAML, Pact, Simplicity, Scilla, Bitcoin
Script, and Michelson restrict instructions, whereby Bitcoin Script is likely the most
restrictive language (also considering that most op-codes are deactivated in Bitcoin).
The idea is to prevent unwanted behaviour by restricting the instruction set to the nec-
essary operations. In practice, infinite loops and recursion would block any node in
the network executing the smart contract. Hence, it can be directly restricted by the
language.
Tail-calls Another critical aspect of the instruction set is the possibility of calling other
contracts. Executing code in other contracts can potentially introduce unexpected be-
haviour leading to unpredictable state changes. State changes can be made explicit by
using an FSM or automata principle with tail-calls. This principle is also suggested
for Solidity [58]. It offers a possibility to update the state of the contract and prevent
potential adversaries to gain access to the contract control flow via reentrancy.
function claim(uint id) public {
require(msg.sender == owner[id]);
funds[id] = 0;
msg.sender.transfer(funds[id]);
}
Listing 1.2. Tail calls implemented in Solidity.
External function execution The EVM offers the call, callcode, and delegatecall
instructions to interact with other contracts. The execution context changes based on
the invoked call. When using special types within a function like msg.sender or
msg.value, the instruction determines which transaction the types refer to. Moreover,
delegatecall grants storage access from the calling contract to the called contract.
An adversarial contract might thus change the calling contracts storage (i.e. local state)
arbitrarily. Hence, these external calls should be restricted, or special communication
types handle their correct execution as, e.g. in Scilla.
Restrict overriding Overriding functions can lead to issues when reviewing code as
it may not be clear which code is actually executed. Assume two functions as listed
below.
function transfer(address to, uint amount) {}
function transfer(address from, address to, uint amount) {}
Listing 1.3. Function overriding with different inputs.
Both functions should theoretically implement the same behaviour. To prevent ambigu-
ities languages like Vyper prevent function overriding.
Overflow The EVM uses fixed-length integers of at most 256 bits. Hence, developers
typically use libraries (e.g. SafeMath) to prevent or detect overflows. IELE, on the
other hand, uses arbitrary-precision signed integers to prevent overflows altogether.
Code re-use Pontiveros, Norvill, and State proposes to re-use EVM code to optimise
the space usage of code with a new op-code [59]. This technique could be applied to
reference proven secure code patterns.
3.5 Semantics
Formal semantics Bamboo, Liquidity, Michelson, and Pact are planned to have a for-
mal semantics once the languages are officially released. Simplicity and Scilla have a
formal semantics defined in Coq. IELE is defined inK, and its implementation has been
derived from the formal semantics. Low-level languages have been informally defined.
In later work, the EVM has been formally defined in K [26], Lem [27], and F* [38]. As
other languages have been informally defined, the correct interpretation of programs is
left to the compiler. Creating a formal semantic for a higher-level language can enable
the creation of verified compilers for said language and support verification efforts.
Explicit types Flint introduces additional types for declaring assets. Smart contracts
typically operate on fungible or non-fungible assets. Instead of using existing types
(e.g. uint), particular asset types can provide additional safety measures like enforcing
updating balances before using a call operation sending the asset.
3.6 Metering
Script size limit Bitcoin Script uses a maximum script size of 10,000 bytes as a re-
striction to script complexity. Combined with its restricted instruction set, this enables
liveness properties of the network. Merkelized Abstract Syntax Tree (MAST) is a pro-
posal to allow larger scripts without increasing the script size limit [60].
Gas The EVM, eWASM, IELE, and Michelson use gas and a gas limit to restrict in-
structions. Rholang’s phlogiston essentially implements the gas concept as well. While
this allows for liveness of the network as it restricts denial of service attacks, it also
opens possible out-of-gas errors. For example, when a function terminates directly after
completing a transfer without updating its state (like an account balance), the function
can be invoked again without affecting the balance. Hence, gas considerations are par-
ticularly important with external and untrusted calls.
3.7 Additional security properties
Contract upgrades Code is immutable in distributed ledgers. Hence, patterns using
contract registries or delegatecall constructs have emerged to upgrade contracts.
However, these patterns introduce problems. An alternative approach that sacrifises live-
ness for more safety is Hydra [61].
Randomness Since any local and global state needs to be deterministic and publicly
verifiable in distributed ledgers, it is hard to obtain a source to generate pseudo-random
numbers. Miners can influence block-related parameters like timestamps and hashes.
The RANDAO suffers from costly implementation. A proposed solution are verifiable
delay functions [62].
Secrets As information needs to be verifiable in distributed ledgers, secrets are hard to
implement. Commit-reveal schemes make use of hash functions where a user commits
to a value by publishing a public hash of the value. Also, zero-knowledge proofs like
zk-SNARKS are used to hide information while keeping them verifiable [63].
Best practices Apart from the features that a language supports, best practices can be
applied to prevent unintended behaviours [58], [64]. Moreover, templates can be used
to create smart contracts [65].
4 Verification methods
Verification approaches are outlined in figure 4. (A) represents verification efforts that
base their analysis on the low-level code that is or will be deployed on the distributed
ledger. Those tools include K/KEVM [26], Lem (with their possible proofs in Coq or
Isabelle/HOL) [27], and F* [25], [38]. Tools listed in (B) use the low-level code and
decompile it into an IR to reason about properties in the contracts like Securify [22],
Mythril [66], Oyente [21], [24], ECF [67], and Maian [68]. ZEUS is an exception as
it uses a high-level language to compile an IR and is not verifying properties based on
the low-level code [23]. (C) describes tools that reason directly on the high-level code.
Solidity can be annotated with Why3 statements to reason about the correctness of the
contract [69]. Oyente can be used as well, but will compile code into an IR. Those
methods can help to find bugs in contracts, but since they do not operate directly on the
low-level code, they rely on verified compilers to infer properties like safety or liveness.
4.1 Overview
Table 2 presents an overview of the tools we have considered for this survey. Verification
efforts can be characterised by five criteria [70, p. 173]. From these, we adopt three and
fixate the other two. The application domain concerns smart contracts on a deterministic
distributed ledger. On these ledgers smart contracts are immutable, hence, verification
before or during, but latest, before deployment, is desirable. Otherwise, they can only
be used to find existing bugs and requires significant efforts to update the contract.
Additionally, we included the language that is covered by the specific tool as well as
the availability of source code. This leaves us with the following criteria.
– Approach: In proof-based verification, the system is represented by a set of formu-
las, while in model-based verification the system is a model. Properties are repre-
sented as formulas. The goal is to either proof (proof-based) or to compute whether
a model (model-based) satisfies these properties. Proof-based methods typically
derive a formal definition of the distributed VM and then try to verify properties
of a smart contract. Model-based methods build a model directly from the smart
contract and verify the properties with an implicit model of the VM.
– Automation: Fully automated approaches have a set of properties and automatically
build a model for the system based on an input (like the source code). Partial au-
tomation typically requires defining properties or using a proof-assistant (e.g. Coq
or Isabelle/HOL) to define and check proofs.
(B)
(B)
cont r act  Token {
  mappi ng( addr ess=>ui nt )  bal ance;
  . . .
}
High-level contract language
. . .
t r ansi t i on Tr ansf er
. . .
Intermediate representation
. . .
PUSH2 0x10 JUMPI  
PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT 
. . .
Low-level contract language
(A)(C)
. . .
[ t r ansf er - success]  cal l Dat a:  
#abi Cal l Dat a( " t r ansf er " ,  
#addr ess( TO) ,  #ui nt 256( VALUE) )  
st at usCode:  _ => EVMC_SUCCESS 
out put :  _ => 
#asByt eSt ackI nWi dt h( 1,  32)  l og:  
. . .  ( .  => #abi Event Log( FROM,  
" Tr ansf er " ,  
#i ndexed( #addr ess( FROM) ) ,  
#i ndexed( #addr ess( TO) ) ,  
#ui nt 256( VALUE) ) ) )
. . .
Verification definitions
(B)
Fig. 2. Different approaches of verification tools regarding their source for deriving a model or
a set of formulas representing the system. Methods listed in (A) directly verify properties from
the model or set of formulas from the low-level code. (B) describes tools using an IR from a
high-level language or from the low-level code to verify the system. Last, (C) describes methods
for verifying properties directly from the high-level code.
– Coverage: Property-based verification is concerned with selected parts of the sys-
tem, while full covers the system as a whole.
– Languages: Lists the languages that are currently, as of September 2018, supported
by the methods. Some of the general tools like Lem, F*, K, and Coq can be used
for any languages.
– Source: Indicates whether the tools and the verification work is available as open
source. This criterion is interesting to verify results, experiment with the available
tools, and potentially expand them.
4.2 Tools
Model-based methods arise from the need to check contracts for known vulnerabilities.
After the DAO and Parity vulnerabilities were known, tools were developed to find
similar patterns in other contracts. The proof-based methods arise from the need to
proof contracts secure. This requires a formal semantics of the VM and the low-level
language. Overall, these methods are used to prevent future vulnerabilities but depend
on an exact definition of properties and rigorous formal semantics.
Model-based Securify is a domain-specific model checker for smart contracts [22]. It
compiles EVM bytecode to semantics facts and then uses a dialect of Datalog to define
compliance and violation properties to verify the semantic facts. It classifies behaviours
of a contract in compliance (matched by compliance properties), violations (matched
Table 2. Overview of model and proof-based verification tools for smart contracts.
Tool Approach Automation Coverage Languages Source Ref.
Securify model full full Solidity, EVM open [22]
Mythril model full property EVM open [66]
Oyente model full property Solidity, EVM open [21], [24]
ZEUS model full property Solidity, Go, Java closed† [23]
ECF model full property EVM open [67]
Maian model full property EVM open [68]
K proof partial full EVM, IELE open [26], [71]
Lem proof partial full EVM open [27], [72]
Coq proof partial partial‡ Scilla, Michelson open [17], [18]
F* proof partial partial‡ EVM open [25], [38]
† We were not able to find open source code.
‡ Theoretically these tools have a full coverage. However, implementation is as of September
2018 not completed.
by violation properties), and warnings (matched by neither). Mythril is a symbolic ex-
ecution of EVM bytecode [66]. EVM bytecode is disassembled into a Mythril object,
and propositional logic is used to reason about the state space represented as a graph.
Oyente [21] and its proposed extension EthIR [24] build a model from EVM bytecode
to verify pre-defined properties. Properties include transaction ordering dependencies,
timestamp dependencies, mishandled exceptions, and reentrancy. ZEUS uses Solidity
or Java and Go (as Hyperledger Fabric contracts) as its basis for evaluation [23]. It com-
piles these contracts into an abstract language. Next, properties defined in XACML are
used to reason about the contract. The properties together with the abstract language
contract get translated to LLVM bitcode for symbolic execution and verification of the
properties. Effectively Callback Free (ECF) objects are a property that is analysed for
Ethereum smart contracts[67]. A callback method opens up the possibility to change the
state of an object (contract) from an external object (contract), which makes reasoning
difficult. Maian works by symbolic execution of a model of EVM bytecode contracts to
find trace vulnerabilities [68]. These vulnerabilities include contracts that leak Ether to
unintended parties, can be killed by arbitrary users or lock Ether that cannot be received.
Proof-based K is a general purpose framework for defining programming languages
[73]. It is used to build a K representation of the EVM, called KEVM [26]. A contract
can be formally verified using the compiled bytecode, the K contract, and the KEVM
virtual machine. Lem is used to defining language semantics and can be used to de-
rive implementations in OCaml and enable proof-based verification using Coq, HOL4,
or Isabelle/HOL [74]. The EVM has been defined in Lem and subsequently contracts
verified using the semantic definition [27]. This work is extended by [72]. Coq is an
interactive theorem prover that can be used for any language theoretically. In practice,
Scilla is defined in Coq, and there are ongoing efforts to verify Scilla contracts [17].
Further, Coq is intended to be used together with the Michelson language [18].
Bhargavan, Swamy, Zanella-Be´guelin, et al. propose to convert Solidity and EVM
bytecode to F* [25]. This can then be used to verify properties in the contract and obtain
a secure implementation. However, the work does not present a full implementation.
Further, a complete small-step semantics of the EVM semantics is presented in [38].
Based on this semantics the authors have implemented in large parts the EVM in F*.
F* has then been compiled to OCaml code to verify the EVM implementation against
the official Ethereum test suite.
4.3 Automation
Full automation Model-based tools are automated. They usually use an SMT solver
(e.g. Z3) to explore the fulfilment of violation of properties. Automation offers a signif-
icant advantage as the pre-defined properties in the tool can easily be verified on other
contracts. Moreover, Securify, Oyente, and Mythril are available as a web-service. This
allows developers to check their contracts without the need to install dependencies for
model checking locally.
Partial automation Proof-based tools are partially automated. The Lem, K, F* se-
mantics are focussing on creating the distributed VM that executes the smart contracts.
Automation can be reached by defining properties contracts should fulfil. This is partly
done by the ERC20 efforts inK and the “Deed” contract in Isabelle/HOL. However, it is
desirable to define the functionality of a contract and then verify its safety, correctness,
and liveness rather than finding selected vulnerabilities. The verification of the prop-
erties is then done using an SMT solver (in K) or using an interactive theorem prover
(Isabelle/HOL, Coq, F*).
4.4 Coverage
Partial, property-based verification Most model-based tools verify selected proper-
ties. In [37] and [21], the authors offer a classification of possible vulnerabilities. These
vulnerabilities build the basis for the properties to check as the tools try to identify vi-
olations or conformance of those patterns to flag a contract as vulnerable. Model-based
tools rely on detecting these properties by static analysis. Oyente and Mythril are shown
to miss vulnerable patterns (false negative) and flag safe contracts as vulnerable (false
positive) [22].
Full verification Securify gives a warning if none of its conformance or violation pat-
terns matches. The desired coverage of proof-based methods is the full contract. General
smart contract security semantics are formally defined in [38]. They build a basis for the
F* small-step semantics and can be adopted to other general proof-based techniques as
well. However, the security semantics presented are not complete. Additional, contract
specific, properties need to be defined to ensure correctness of the program. By giving
a formal specification of the contract functionalities, a contract can be deemed correct.
This approach is beneficial for common standards (e.g. ERC20 or ERC721). A short-
coming of proof-based verification is that a verified contract might contain bugs due to
incomplete or inaccuracies in the specification or VM semantics [75].
4.5 Languages
EVM The majority of the tools use the EVM bytecode to derive a model of the contract.
Moreover, most models do not implement all EVM opcodes. Hence, vulnerabilities
might remain undetected as not all contracts can be fully verified. Major work efforts are
taken in building a formal semantics of the EVM (K, Lem, F*). The F* implementation
is partially complete.
IR and low-level languages While the EVM semantic is defined after its implementa-
tion, IELE, Scilla, and Michelson are designed with formal verification in mind. Hence,
their semantics are currently developed and in the future formal verification should be
comparably easy. Further, their formal semantics approach helps to build verified com-
pilers.
High-level languages ZEUS is an exception as it builds the model based on higher-
level languages such as Solidity or Java and Go.
4.6 Source
Documentation All tools have a description in a paper or technical report that gives de-
tails about their internals. They offer extensions by creating new properties for verifica-
tion. The K framework has extensive documentation and examples available, followed
by the work on Lem and Isabelle/HOL. The Coq and F* methods have been introduced
this year, and documentation is yet sparse.
Source code Except for Securify and ZEUS, tools can be cloned locally, and additional
properties can be added.
5 Discussion
Language design High-level languages for smart contracts are designed and improved
to promote safe smart contracts. This is achieved by making state changes explicit by
using an FSM/automata approach. They typically restrict the instruction set by only al-
lowing finite loops and recursion. Moreover, the code should be as explicit as possible
by preventing function overloading, creating explicit types for assets and units, and pro-
moting pure functions. Intermediary languages are developed with formal verification
and optimisations in mind. This is an attempt to bring best practices from software en-
gineering and language theory to distributed ledgers. Low-level languages are built to
allow formal verification and at the same time give a run-time optimised execution on
a distributed ledger. Combining those practices and applying them in the development
cycle helps create secure smart contracts.
Verification Verification efforts include categorising and defining security properties
for smart contracts, developing model-based tools to verify that contracts are not vul-
nerable to known bugs, and formal semantics with the intention to prove compliance of
a contract implementation to an abstract specification. Proof-based verification requires
more effort than model checking for existing vulnerabilities. Hence, verification is sen-
sible for high-value and critical contracts. In fact, the Casper contract is currently being
formally verified.
Formal semantics and verified compilers A main focus is developing IRs with formal
semantics and creating formal semantics for existing low-level languages. We argue
that in the future, more projects need to adopt formal semantics on all language levels
to promote verification efforts and prevent ambiguities in compiler implementations.
Further, this allows to create verified compilers making it easier to argue about contracts
in a high-level language [27]. Next, current formal semantics for the EVM combine the
VM and the ledger in a single definition. Future work is to separate the semantics for
the ledger and the execution environment.
Complete security definitions An initial proposal of formal security definitions is
made in [38]. Those definitions are taken from the perspective of Solidity and the
EVM. Hence, more general security definitions for various execution environments are
required. Also, it could be interesting to separate the execution environment from the
ledger. Moreover, proposed standards like the ERC20 can be formally defined as part
of the proposal process. This would allow to verify implementations against a formal
specification. Possibly, automated formal verification methods can be built on this.
6 Conclusion
An overview of smart contracts and verification methods is presented. Languages are
developed and improved to allow easier verification by defining formal semantics. Also,
secure patterns like explicit state transitions and restricted instructions are applied.
Verification efforts concentrate on finding known vulnerabilities and formally defining
smart contract logic to verify implementations.
We note three areas of future work. Formal semantics are being adopted for low-
level languages, and selected IRs have been designed from a formal semantics. How-
ever, high-level languages with full formal semantics are just being developed. Formal
semantics on all levels of languages is a requirement to develop verified compilers. Ver-
ified compilers and formal semantics can then be used to build automated proof-based
verification methods.
Acknowledgement We like to thank Ben Livshits for his helpful comments on our
work. This research is funded by the Outlier Ventures research grant for the Imperial
Centre for Cryptocurrency Research and Engineering.
References
[1] Reid Smith. “The Contract Net Protocol: High-Level Communication and Con-
trol in a Distributed Problem Solver”. In: IEEE Transactions on Computers C-
29.12 (Dec. 1980), pp. 1104–1113.
[2] Nick Szabo. Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks. 1997.
URL: http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/
548/469 (visited on 04/07/2017).
[3] Jesper Andersen, Ebbe Elsborg, Fritz Henglein, et al. “Compositional specifica-
tion of commercial contracts”. In: International Journal on Software Tools for
Technology Transfer 8.6 (Oct. 2006), pp. 485–516.
[4] Marcel Kyas, Cristian Prisacariu, and Gerardo Schneider. “Run-Time Monitoring
of Electronic Contracts”. In: Automated Technology for Verification and Analy-
sis. ATVA 2008. 2. 2008, pp. 397–407.
[5] Lai Xu. “A multi-party contract model”. In: ACM SIGecom Exchanges 5.1 (2004),
pp. 13–23.
[6] Massimo Bartoletti and Livio Pompianu. “An Empirical Analysis of Smart Con-
tracts: Platforms, Applications, and Design Patterns”. In: Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science. Vol. 10323. Cham, 2017, pp. 494–509.
[7] Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja. The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-
Chain Instant Payments. Tech. rep. 2016, p. 59. URL: https://lightning.
network/lightning-network-paper.pdf.
[8] Joseph Poon and Vitalik Buterin. “Plasma: Scalable Autonomous Smart Con-
tracts”. 2017. URL: https://plasma.io/plasma.pdf.
[9] Gavin Wood. Polkadot: Vision for a Heterogeneous Multi-Chain Framework.
Tech. rep. 2017, pp. 1–21. URL: https://github.com/w3f/polkadot-
white-paper/raw/master/PolkaDotPaper.pdf.
[10] Jason Teutsch and Christian Reitwießner. “A scalable verification solution for
blockchains”. 2017.
[11] Phil Daian. Analysis of the DAO exploit. 2016. URL: http://hackingdistributed.
com/2016/06/18/analysis-of-the-dao-exploit/ (visited on
10/09/2016).
[12] Lorenz Breidenbach, Philip Daian, Ari Juels, et al. An In-Depth Look at the Par-
ity Multisig Bug. URL: http://hackingdistributed.com/2017/07/
22/deep-dive-parity-bug/ (visited on 09/03/2018).
[13] Parity Tech. A Postmortem on the Parity Multi-Sig Library Self-Destruct. 2017.
URL: https://paritytech.io/a-postmortem-on-the-parity-
multi-sig-library-self-destruct/ (visited on 09/03/2018).
[14] Yoichi Hirai. Bamboo. 2018. URL: https://github.com/pirapira/
bamboo (visited on 08/16/2018).
[15] Ethereum Foundation. Vyper documentation. 2018. URL: https://vyper.
readthedocs.io/en/latest/?badge=latest (visited on 08/16/2018).
[16] Franklin Schrans, Susan Eisenbach, and Sophia Drossopoulou. “Writing Safe
Smart Contracts in Flint”. 2018.
[17] Ilya Sergey, Amrit Kumar, and Aquinas Hobor. “Scilla: a Smart Contract Intermediate-
Level LAnguage”. 2018. URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1801.00687.
[18] Dynamic Ledger Solutions. Michelson: the language of Smart Contracts in Tezos.
2017. URL: https://www.michelson-lang.com/ (visited on 05/10/2018).
[19] Stuart Popejoy. “The Pact Smart-Contract Language”. 2017. URL: http://
kadena.io.
[20] Theodoros Kasampalis, Dwight Guth, Brandon Moore, et al. IELE : An intermediate-
level Blockchain language designed and implemented using formal semantics.
Tech. rep. 2018.
[21] Loi Luu, Duc-Hiep Chu, Hrishi Olickel, et al. “Making Smart Contracts Smarter”.
In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security - CCS’16. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2016,
pp. 254–269.
[22] Petar Tsankov, Andrei Dan, Dana Drachsler-Cohen, et al. “Securify: Practical
Security Analysis of Smart Contracts”. 2017.
[23] Sukrit Kalra, Seep Goel, Mohan Dhawan, et al. “ZEUS: Analyzing Safety of
Smart Contracts”. In: Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Secu-
rity Symposium. February. Reston, VA: Internet Society, 2018.
[24] Elvira Albert, Pablo Gordillo, Benjamin Livshits, et al. “EthIR: A Framework for
High-Level Analysis of Ethereum Bytecode”. 2018. URL: http://arxiv.
org/abs/1805.07208.
[25] Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Nikhil Swamy, Santiago Zanella-Be´guelin, et al. “For-
mal Verification of Smart Contracts”. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Work-
shop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security - PLAS’16 (2016),
pp. 91–96.
[26] Everett Hildenbrandt, Manasvi Saxena, Xiaoran Zhu, et al. KEVM: A Complete
Semantics of the Ethereum Virtual Machine. Tech. rep. 2017, pp. 1–33. URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/2142/97207.
[27] Yoichi Hirai. “Defining the Ethereum Virtual Machine for Interactive Theorem
Provers”. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 10323. 2017, pp. 520–535.
[28] Satoshi Nakamoto. “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system”. 2008.
[29] Vitalik Buterin. A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Applica-
tion Platform. 2013. URL: https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/
wiki/White-Paper (visited on 10/09/2016).
[30] Ethereum Foundation. Solidity 0.4.24 documentation. 2018. URL: https://
solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/ (visited on 08/30/2018).
[31] OCamlPro SAS. Welcome to Liquidity’s documentation! 2018. URL: http://
www.liquidity-lang.org/doc/ (visited on 09/03/2018).
[32] Russell O’Connor. “Simplicity: A New Language for Blockchains”. In: (2017),
pp. 1–34. arXiv: 1711.03028.
[33] Bitcoin Wiki. Script. 2018. URL: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/
Script%7B%5C#%7DOpcodes (visited on 06/27/2018).
[34] Gavin Wood. “Ethereum: a secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger”.
2014.
[35] Joseph Bonneau, Andrew Miller, Jeremy Clark, et al. “Research Perspectives and
Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies”. In: IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (2015), pp. 104–121.
[36] Alexandra Covaci, Simone Madeo, Patrick Motylinski, et al. “NECTAR: Non-
Interactive Smart Contract Protocol using Blockchain Technology”. 2018. URL:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04860.
[37] Nicola Atzei, Massimo Bartoletti, and Tiziana Cimoli. “A survey of attacks on
Ethereum smart contracts (SoK)”. In: POST. Vol. 10204 LNCS. July. 2017,
pp. 164–186. arXiv: arXiv:1011.1669v3.
[38] Ilya Grishchenko, Matteo Maffei, and Clara Schneidewind. “A Semantic Frame-
work for the Security Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts”. In: Principles of
Security and Trust. Vol. 10804. Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 243–
269.
[39] Chris Lattner and Vikram Adve. “LLVM: A Compilation Framework for Life-
long Program Analysis and Transformation”. In: Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Symposium on Code Generation and Optimization (CGO) (2004).
[40] Ethereum Foundation. Joyfully Universal Language for (Inline) Assembly. 2018.
URL: https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.4.24/julia.
html (visited on 09/04/2018).
[41] Michael Burge. Pyramid Scheme. 2018. URL: http://www.michaelburge.
us/2017/11/28/write-your-next-ethereum-contract-in-
pyramid-scheme.html (visited on 05/30/2018).
[42] Michael Coblenz. “Obsidian: A Safer Blockchain Programming Language”. In:
2017 IEEE/ACM 39th International Conference on Software Engineering Com-
panion (ICSE-C). IEEE, May 2017, pp. 97–99.
[43] Lucius Gregory Meredith, Jack Pettersson, Gary Stephenson, et al. Contracts,
Composition, and Scaling: The Rholang specification 0.2. Tech. rep. 2018.
[44] Shaul Kfir. Distributed ledgers need more than traditional application design
patterns. 2018. URL: https://medium.com/daml-driven/distributed-
ledgers-need-more-than-traditional-applications-design-
patterns-e2d895d767ff (visited on 08/17/2018).
[45] Simon Meier and Neil Mitchell. What properties must an enterprise smart con-
tract language have? 2018. URL: https://medium.com/daml-driven/
what- properties- must- an- enterprise- smart- contract-
language-have-b4c251582343 (visited on 08/31/2018).
[46] Ben Lippmeier and Edward Kmett. A new language for a new paradigm: smart
contracts. 2018. URL: https : / / medium . com / daml - driven / a -
new - language - for - a - new - paradigm - smart - contracts -
648cc30294ad (visited on 08/17/2018).
[47] Martin Huschenbett and Jost Berthold. The only valid smart contract is a vol-
untary one - easier said than done. 2018. URL: https://medium.com/
daml - driven / the - only - valid - smart - contract - is - a -
voluntary-one-easier-said-than-done-726df37c04c (vis-
ited on 08/31/2018).
[48] Alexander Bernauer and Ratko Veprek. Trust but verify is a valuable DLT model
- does your language support it? 2018. URL: https://medium.com/
daml - driven / trust - but - verify - is - a - valuable - dlt -
model-does-your-language-support-it-bdb6ea7174c (vis-
ited on 08/31/2018).
[49] Ognjen Maric and Robin S. Krom. Keeping smart contracts private is hard -
unless you truly understand them. 2018. URL: https://medium.com/
daml-driven/keeping-smart-contracts-private-is-hard-
unless-you-truly-understand-them-920b31d723e4 (visited on
08/31/2018).
[50] So¨ren Bleikertz. Smart contract language: the real arbiter of truth? 2018. URL:
https://medium.com/daml-driven/smart-contract-language-
the-real-arbiter-of-truth-efe833031ca1 (visited on 08/31/2018).
[51] Andreas Lochbihler. How difficult is it to write correct smart contracts? Depends
on your tools! 2018. URL: https://medium.com/daml-driven/how-
difficult- is- it- to- write- correct- smart- contracts-
depends-on-your-tools-5f6bceb2d510 (visited on 08/31/2018).
[52] Darko Pilav and Silvan Villiger. Smart contract code: when what you don’t write
is as important as what you do. 2018. URL: https://medium.com/daml-
driven/smart-contract-code-when-what-you-dont-write-
is-as-important-as-what-you-do-d11725a9fb4 (visited on
08/31/2018).
[53] Ethereum Foundation. eWASM. 2018. URL: https://github.com/ewasm/
design (visited on 08/16/2018).
[54] Wanderer. EIP 48: EVM 2.0 WASM. 2015. URL: https://github.com/
ethereum/EIPs/issues/48 (visited on 08/16/2018).
[55] Christian Cachin. “Architecture of the hyperledger blockchain fabric”. 2016.
[56] Anastasia Mavridou and Aron Laszka. “Designing Secure Ethereum Smart Con-
tracts: A Finite State Machine Based Approach”. 2018.
[57] Florian Idelberger, Guido Governatori, Re´gis Riveret, et al. “Evaluation of Logic-
Based Smart Contracts for Blockchain Systems”. In: Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Ed. by Jose Julio Alferes, Leopoldo Bertossi, Guido Governatori, et al.
Vol. 9718. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International
Publishing, 2016, pp. 167–183.
[58] ConsenSys. Ethereum Contract Security Techniques and Tips. 2018. URL: https:
//consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/
bibliography/ (visited on 09/15/2018).
[59] Beltran Borja Fiz Pontiveros, Robert Norvill, and Radu State. “Recycling Smart
Contracts: Compression of the Ethereum Blockchain”. In: 2018 9th IFIP Inter-
national Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security, NTMS 2018.
Vol. January. 2018, pp. 1–5.
[60] David Harding. What is a Bitcoin Merklized Abstract Syntax Tree (MAST)? 2017.
URL: https://bitcointechtalk.com/what-is-a-bitcoin-
merklized-abstract-syntax-tree-mast-33fdf2da5e2f (vis-
ited on 04/25/2018).
[61] Lorenz Breidenbach, Phil Daian, Floriantra Er, et al. “Enter the Hydra: Towards
Principled Bug Bounties and Exploit-Resistant Smart Contracts”. In: 27th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18). 2018, pp. 1335–1352.
[62] Dan Boneh, Joseph Bonneau, Benedikt Bu¨nz, et al. “Verifiable Delay Functions”.
In: (2018), pp. 1–29.
[63] Eli Ben Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Christina Garman, et al. “Zerocash: Decen-
tralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin”. In: 2014 IEEE Symposium on Se-
curity and Privacy. IEEE, May 2014, pp. 459–474.
[64] Maximilian Wohrer and Uwe Zdun. “Smart contracts: Security patterns in the
ethereum ecosystem and solidity”. In: 2018 IEEE 1st International Workshop on
Blockchain Oriented Software Engineering, IWBOSE 2018 - Proceedings 2018-
Janua (2018), pp. 2–8.
[65] Christopher D. Clack, Vikram A. Bakshi, and Lee Braine. “Smart Contract Tem-
plates: foundations, design landscape and research directions”. In: (Aug. 2016),
pp. 1–15. arXiv: 1608.00771.
[66] Bernhard Mueller. Smashing Ethereum Smart Contracts for Fun and Real Profit.
Tech. rep. 2018, pp. 1–54.
[67] Shelly Grossman, Ittai Abraham, Guy Golan-Gueta, et al. “Online detection of
effectively callback free objects with applications to smart contracts”. In: Pro-
ceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages 2.POPL (Dec. 2017), pp. 1–
28. arXiv: 1801.04032.
[68] Ivica Nikolic, Aashish Kolluri, Ilya Sergey, et al. “Finding The Greedy, Prodigal,
and Suicidal Contracts at Scale”. 2018. URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/
1802.06038.
[69] Christian Reitwiessner. Formal Verification for Solidity Contracts. 2015. URL:
https://forum.ethereum.org/discussion/3779/formal-
verification-for-solidity-contracts (visited on 09/15/2018).
[70] Michael Huth and Mark Ryan. Logic in Computer Science: Modelling and Rea-
soning about Systems. Second. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[71] Daejun Park, Yi Zhang, Manasvi Saxena, et al. “A Formal Verification Tool for
Ethereum VM Bytecode”. In: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSOFT Inter-
national Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering (FSE’18). 2018,
pp. 18–21.
[72] Sidney Amani, Myriam Be´gel, Maksym Bortin, et al. “Towards verifying ethereum
smart contract bytecode in Isabelle/HOL”. In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIG-
PLAN International Conference on Certified Programs and Proofs - CPP 2018.
Vol. 61. i. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2018, pp. 66–77.
[73] Grigore Rosu. “K: A Rewriting-Based Framework for Computations - Prelimi-
nary version”. 2007.
[74] Dominic P. Mulligan, Scott Owens, Kathryn E. Gray, et al. “Lem: reusable en-
gineering of real-world semantics”. In: Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGPLAN
international conference on Functional programming - ICFP ’14. Vol. 49. 9.
New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2014, pp. 175–188.
[75] Yoichi Hirai. “Formal Verification of Deed Contract in Ethereum Name Service”.
2016.
